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THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER –
FRIEND, FOREIGNER, PATRIOT?*
Abstract: The paper explores the imagery and constructions of alterity in the
contemporary world. The image of the other is at the same time the image of ourselves,
mostlythroughthemetaphorofthe“stranger.”This“stranger”representstheunknown,
sohe/sheoccasionallyprovokesfearandresentment,ifonlyforappearingphysicallydif-
ferent in the “mainstream” culture. This paper traces the genesis and development of
certain modernist ideals (including the need to postulate the existence of others as
strange and potentially threatening). The apparent lack of comprehension for (cultural,
ethnic, racial) others is just a symptom of the much deeper disorder – in the quest for ra-
tionality, the meaning ofsimple human communication seems to be forgotten. Justlike in
a hall of mirrors, the images that people encounter are basically the images of them-
selves–onlytheyhavebeendistortedthroughnationalistorracistrhetoric.Usingtheex-
amples from theory (anthropology, feminism, cultural studies) as well as from specific
cultures(Brazil,SouthAfrica,formerYugoslavia,France),andfollowingontheworksof
scholars like Kristeva, Linke and Balibar, the author demonstrates the logic behind the
need to exclude others, as well as the fact that all of these attempts will eventually back-
fire. For we cannot exclude others if we do not at the same time exclude ourselves.
Key words: alterity, anthropological aspects of the other, anthropology and
identity, political anthropology.
Exergue: (Dis)Locations
I’m all these words, all these strangers, this dust words, with
no ground for their settling, no sky for their dispersing, com-
ing together to say, fleeing one another to say, that I am they,
all of them, all of those that merge, those that past, those that
never meet, and nothing else, yes, something else, that I’m
something quite different, a quite different thing.
(Beckett, 1958: 386)
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* This paper developed as part of the research project “Democratic Models of
Developing Social Cohesion and Economic Development in the Processes of Serbia’s
European Integrations” of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, financed by the
Ministry of Science, Republic of Serbia.In selecting the topic for this seminar
1 I was considering both
the place (location) where I was speaking, and the place (location)
where I came from. Istanbul – where this paper was originally pre-
sented – is the metaphor for alterity within European alterities (in-
cluding the perennial question: is Turkey – Istanbul included – part
of “Europe” or not?), metaphor of the exotic and distant other, “Ori-
ental” but yet understandable in the “Occidental” sense, and there-
fore somehow “acceptable”. Tourists should come to Istanbul. (I am
quite happy to be a tourist for a couple of days as well.) EU has be-
gan (despite objections from France and The Netherlands) negotia-
tions on accession with Turkey. Istanbul has made it to songs, all
kinds of advertisements, and even a recent James Bond film. It is an
“other” that is somehow close to “home” (a couple of hours flight
from all the West European capital cities) – if not that easy to situate
geographically (as it is on the very border of “Europe” and “Asia” –
creating it, being this border at the same time).
On the other hand, the notion of flux, instability, constant
change (involving total destruction), and uncertainty is something
that comes “naturally” to me – but I am at the same time well aware
how frightening these notions might appear to someone raised to
think in specifically well-determined and well-defined categories. (I
am not implying here that all change is the same – but I do feel rela-
tively at ease with the notion of constant change.)
On the other hand, the hyperreality of the remnants of ex-Yu-
goslavia is really tragic-comical, as I wrote elsewhere (Boškoviæ
1997b). Most recently, the name of the country has been changed
into “The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro”, rendering any
mention of “Yugoslavia” obsolete, so one can easily imagine how
does one who identified himselfas an ex-Yugoslav fit there. (It is in-
teresting to note that the same people who were the first to light the
flames of war in an attempt “to preserve the Yugoslavia” in 1991
were the same ones who initiated and celebrated the final demise of
the very name “Yugoslavia”.)
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1 This is a version of the paper presented in the seminar in the Department of
Sociology, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, 30 April 2002. I am very grateful to
Dr. Ugur Kömeçogluand toProfessorArus YumulforinvitingmetoIstanbul,which
led me to consider again some important issues dealing with alterity and representa-
tions of the other.This sense of alterity (dis)locates the spaces that I inhabit as
well as the ones where I wish to go. There is a strange reality, of
course, inwhichmypassport identifies mewithout anyambiguityas
a “non-European” in Western Europe, and as a “European” in South
Africa or Brazil. I have to admit that I do not know what “Europe” is
–inaninteresting1998book(“Europebetweeneuphoriaandeutha-
nasia”), Slovenian sociologist Toma  Mastnak claims that the very
idea arose only as the sense of closedness and the necessity of mak-
ing barriers emerged – claiming that the whole idea of “Europe” as
we know it today, is intrinsically connected to and associated with
the (post-15
th century) Western Europeans’ hatred of Muslims (cf.
Mastnak, 2002). Another extremely interesting look at this issue is
inJuliaKristeva’sbookontheCrisisoftheEuropeanSubject,where
she questions the whole notion of “European” identity – from the
perspective that there should be more general, universal humanist
values that musttake precedence overparticular tribal orethnic feel-
ings. This is a type of “humanism” that I respect, despite feeling un-
easy about its universalist pretensions.
Imagining the other
Modernity, by comparison, seems never to have entertained
similar doubts as to the universal grounding of its status. The
hierarchy of values imposed upon the world administered by
the north-western tip of the European peninsula was so firm,
and supported by powers so enormously overwhelming, that
for a couple of centuries it remained the baseline of the world
vision, rather than an overtly debated problem. Seldom
brought to the level of consciousness, it remained the all-pow-
erful‘taken-for-granted’oftheera.Itwasevidenttoeverybody
except the blind and the ignorant that the West was superior to
the East, white to black, civilized to crude, cultured to unedu-
cated,sanetoinsane,healthytosick,mantowoman,normalto
criminal, more to less, riches to austerity, high productivity to
low productivity, high culture to low culture. All these ‘evi-
dences’are now gone. Not a single one remains unchallenged.
What is more, we can see now that they did not hold in separa-
tion from each other; they made sense together, as manifesta-
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5tions of the same power complex, the same power structure of
theworld,whichretainedcredibilityaslongasthestructurere-
mained intact, but were unlikely to survive its demise.
(Bauman, 1993: 135-136)
Hatred and fearusuallygo together. In a strange twist, theycan
also be programmed retroactively, as witnessed by some observers
(andrepeatedlyandverysuccessfullypointedoutforoveradecadeby
some philosophers/cultural critics like Slavoj  i ek) in the case of the
wars in the former Yugoslavia, where journalists, diplomats and vari-
ous people of good will went around asking people “Isn’t it true that
youalwayshatedyourneighbors?”,andthusprojectingtheirownfan-
tasies of conflict and negotiation. Quite unsurprisingly, the members
of the public allowed them to live out their fantasies in full, confirm-
ing that indeed “they always hated their neighbours” – even though
theyknewitwasnottrue.Somehow,however,thismadeperfectsense
– in a world divided between the well-defined and clearly outlined
forces of Good and Evil, the Evil ones were a necessity. Furthermore,
they could then justify the claims that the results of the horrendous
war for territories and looting (aggression and genocide masked in far
morerespectabletermslike“ethnicconflict”or“civilwar”)shouldbe
accepted as fait accompli – no right of the return for millions of refu-
gees, for example (as commented recently by Hayden, 2002). I do not
believe that these kind of attempted justifications of “ancient Balkan
hatreds” merit any response – they are logically incoherent, factually
false, and theoretically untenable.
Some kind of a global rationalization of inequality among dif-
ferent peoples occurred from the late 16
th and early 17
th centuries CE
onwards. The “discovery” of the New World in the late 15
th and early
16
thcenturies,aswellasthedebatesthatfollowedontheissueofslav-
ery permanently changed the Western world. This spectacular en-
counterwith“theother”broughtshockandamazementalongwiththe
large-scale ethnocide and at the same time ecocide, but it also broad-
ened intellectual horizons.
2 It is interesting to compare the alternative
waysofconstructingtheimage(s)oftheother–thatistosay,toestab-
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2 I am not implying that this ethnocide and ecocide was a necessary or in any
way justifiablepricetobepaidforthisbroadeningofintellectualhorizons–Iamjust
stating this as a fact.lish whether Indians orSpaniards had souls (foracontemporaryper-
spective on these debates, see Latour, 2004: 451-453, 455). This is
connected with the important shift in the whole system of the pro-
duction and justification of knowledge, related to a new, modernist,
rational, idea of science and what scientific discourse should be all
about(foraverygoodexpositionofthisprocess,seeToulmin1990).
These debates continued well into the continuing centuries,
but it is extremely important that they be put in the specific context
of when and where they took place (Boškoviæ, 1997a; Latour 2004).
When they are re-visited in the “modern” (or contemporary) times,
theyneed tobeconsidered asanintegral partofthe whole (primarily
West European) project of modernity, with some of its unintended
consequences.
3 Therefore, many of the things present in the every-
day politics of today, many of the reasons for lamenting by the
left-wing parties and individuals (like the success of the extreme
right-wing and neo-fascist political parties and projects throughout
Europe)
4 actually have a very long (and quite colourful!) history.
“European” rationality – the Modernist project
The basic presupposition, it seemsto me,still stands: namely,
that the question is not “Fascism – yes or no?”, but “How
much fascism?”.
(Moènik, 1998: 10)
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3 Foucault proposed looking at modernity “rather as an attitude than as a pe-
riod of history (...) a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice
made by certain people (...) a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and
behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents it-
selfasatask”(1984:39,passim).Itisveryinterestingtocomparethisandotherlucid
observationswith the general tone that Adorno and Horkheimer use in the Dialectics
of the Enlightenment, published in 1944. According to them, Nazism (as well as the
Holocaust!)wasalsoadirectconsequenceoftheEuropeanmodernistproject–itwas
not just science and great technological discoveries…
4 This could be easily related to the recent (May 2005) failure of the referen-
dums on the EU constitution in France and The Netherlands. The failure of the lead-
ing political (“pro-European”) forces to explain their ideas to the general public is
inseparable from the rise of extreme nationalism, racism, xenophobia and all the re-
lated phenomena. One leads to the other. European voters terrified of the other will
not vote for any decision that will lead to the expansion of cultural and intellectual
horizons(hence,itisquitetellingthattheperceived“threat”ofTurkey’saccessionto
the EU played an important role in the “no” camp).Twoconcepts areofspecialinterestformehere–universality
and rationality. They are both interconnected in the big project initi-
ated five centuries ago: universality sweeps away all the potential
differences between cultures in contact, as rationality tells “us” that
even if “we” would recognize the differences, there is still the good
and the evil, and it is clear where the good is. The dominant culture
does not ever posit itself as just one of the many – it firmlypositions
itself as the model against which all the other cultures (peoples, cus-
toms,moralcodes, individual behavior, etc…) will be measured and
judged. The dominant culture of the era is the culture (or “civiliza-
tion” – as Huntington would call it) – the other ones are merely ex-
otic appendages, places where to spend a holiday, or sources of raw
industrial materials. The look of the colonial or imperial masters is
important here – others are observed or studied, photographs taken
ofexotic-looking people in their “ethnic” dress, others areexamined
like specimens to be dissected (as seen in the numerous textbooks
dealing with “racial types” – see the examples mentioned in Boni,
2002 and Bloom, 1990, 1999). With benevolence of the imperial
masters, some things and some individuals might be more accept-
able than others.
In a relatively recent paper, and in his typically irreverent
style,  i ek (2001) questioned the perceived limits of our tolerance
forother cultures and points ofview.Helooked atthe other extreme,
at the paradoxes brought by completely equating different points of
view and different perspectives (for example, a German Nazi film
director complaining in 1950 how American Jews don’t understand
him –  i ek, 2001: 340). I am a bit uneasy with the broad-sweeping
consequences of  i ek’s critique, as much as I agree with it. I am
afraid that what he postulates is a specific kind of imperial look – or
simply refusal to deal with other cultures that are based on different
cultural premises from the “Western” ones. Having said that, I wish
tostressmyagreementwithhiminthespecificexamples(andexam-
ples of the authors he criticizes, like Rorty and Singer – see  i ek,
2001: 340-341), but also the fact that cognitive relativism does not
mean moral relativism. There are many people (myself included)
who are cognitive relativists – but not moral relativists.
This has to do with the whole complex of alterity as some-
thing different and embodying different people – “strangers”. Julia
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some of the reactions to others through history. However, she fo-
cused on the notion of the individual (even when she/he is
“co-opted” into a larger whole by virtue of similarity or dissimilar-
ity) – but in recent years we have been witnesses of some large scale
violence directed against the whole ethnic groups (or nations):
Bosnia and Herzegovina (around 200,000 dead), Rwanda (800,000
dead) and Congo (at least two million dead) stand as stark reminders
of what the extreme consequences of alterity could be. Therefore, I
think that we should turn our attention to perceptions of others as
part of groups (or larger entities – “ethnic groups” or “nations”). For
once others are perceived as obstacles – be it to progress, develop-
ment, culture, good living, or even “civilization” – the rational
choiceistogetridofthem.Oncetheirhumanityisabstractedoreven
called into question (for “they” are so different from “us”!),
5 their
lives become expendable. Once racist policies are wrapped in the
aura of self-righteousness and defensive behaviour (as with Zionism
in Israel), anything goes.
However, it is not enough just that “the might is right” – the
rationality calls forarational and above all moral justification. Kill-
ing and destroying (expelling, if there is no other option) as many
others as possible is “good” for “us” because that will enable safety
and security (again, the state of Israel and its policies provides a
good example here). This safety and security implies loneliness and
familiarity –wewanttobealone because wewanttobeinafamiliar
context and familiar surroundings. There are many forms of ratio-
nalization of such behavior – besides examples in the already men-
tioned Hayden’s article, Bielefeld (1998) in his collection of essays
points to the dangers of ontologization of debates about others (for-
eigners), especially in the form of the post-1990 catchphrase of the
“ethnic conflict” (Geertz, 1993). Perhaps unconsciously, some au-
thors seek to explain massmurder,rape and pillaging in termsofsci-
entific or scholarly theories. Bydoing so, they manageto elevate the
101
F
I
L
O
Z
O
F
I
J
A
I
D
R
U
Š
T
V
O
3
/
2
0
0
5
5 And ironically, of course, in allthreecasesreferredto above, itwas the very
lack of difference that was taken to constitute the difference itself! It seems that the
sameness of the people irritated them to such an extent that they had to invent and
re-invent the perceived “inhumanity” of their neighbors. Eriksen (2004) argued very
convincingly for also taking into account kinship when discussing nationalism and
ethnicity.criminalsandactuallygivetheiractionssomerationality.(Itisworth
noting that since the wars in the former Yugoslavia erupted, the
so-called “international community” negotiated and dealt only with
thepeople whohadguns–allthealternative oranti-warandanti-na-
tionalistic voices were completely marginalized… Hence, its sur-
prise with the apparent inability of some of the newly formed states
in the region to form some stable institutions of civil society, does
seem surprising, to say the least.)
Bielefeldisoneoftheauthors(alongwithBauman)whotrace
all the animosity and vilification of foreigners at least to Fichte and
the whole European modernist project. As mentioned above (and
pointed out by authors like Toulmin and Bauman), modernity was
one of the direct consequences of the great colonial expansion of the
Western powers – it created powerful fantasies of Truth and Reason
(many detailed observations of the post-18
th century “March to-
wards Reason” have been done by Foucault) and delusions about
theirpower.According toLuhmann,“ThehistoryofEuropean ratio-
nality can be described as the history of the dissolution of a rational-
ity continuum that had connected the observer in the world with the
world”(Luhmann,1998:23).Luhmannsawthe[then]currenttrends
in rationality as a step in the wrong direction, inviting us to re-con-
sider the models of mutual understanding mentioned by the authors
like Toulmin (without actually referring to him). On the one hand, it
seems that ways of doing things and interpreting them might have a
verylonghistory–asUliLinketracedinherbook(1999).Theideol-
ogy of “blood and soil” as we know it, however, is a much more re-
cent invention, it depends on the “nation-states” (a 19
th-century con-
struction) and on what Balibar called “fictive ethnicity” (in Balibar
and Wallerstein, 1997: 130-131).
(Mis)placing the other: gender and race
Tickets are expensive. So are the hotels.
Names range from Rita to Juanita.
In walks a policeman, and what he tells
you is “You are persona non grata in terra incognita.”
Joseph Brodsky (“Abroad”)
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border between “us” and potentially hostile “them”. Others include
gender,classandrace.Iwillnotdealherewithclassindetail–avery
goodoverviewisinBalibarandWallerstein, 1997–butjustmention
some peculiarities about gender and race.
Afewwordsaboutthediscipline whereIfindmyselfworking
(and learned people from anthropology say that I should regard my-
selfasoneof“them”becauseofmytraining,mycurrentinstitutional
affiliation, research, and my degree) should help contextualize this
discussion. Anthropologists are engaged in some form of a post-co-
lonial discourse whenever they step (professionally, of course) into
the world of a “strange” or “exotic” culture (the fact that it might be
their own culture does not affect this). “Step into” might not be the
correct expression, since one of the most important conditions for
the understanding of another culture (and the whole different set of
values, norms, representations, etc.) is being aware of the differ-
ences. Except in the cases where the anthropologist or ethnographer
is himself/herself a member of a certain community (and sometimes
even in those cases, but on a different plane), there is a fundamental
difference. Two worlds meet. Or, alternatively, two (or more) cul-
tures, worlds (sometimes literally centuries) apart.
6 This “stepping
into” should not be taken only in a literal sense, since it presupposes
any form of communication about, or with, a culture or a society (or
group, individual, etc.) that isbeing studied. Another thing that it as-
sumes is that there will be elements which the anthropologist will
find impossible to classify or explain, so she/he should not try to
force her/his preconceptions on the culture, but to accept the poten-
tial unintelligibility of certain elements of the studied culture as a
fact, culture as a specific set of values for each individual and dis-
tinctive community or group.
Of course, the question arises of the objective (if there is such
thing) validity of doing any research. It was as far back as in 1881,
that one of the founding fathers of anthropology, Adolf Bastian, re-
marked that
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6 Of course, there are differences within specific cultures as well as differ-
ences between anthropologists/ethnographers and cultures they come from – I am
just using these universal concepts here to illustrate my point.For us, primitive societies (Naturvölker) are ephemeral, that
is, as regards our knowledge of, and our relations with them,
in fact, inasmuch as they exist for us at all. At the very in-
stance they become known to us they are doomed.
(quoted in Fabian, 1991: 194)
Therefore, as Bastian somewhat cynically remarked so long
ago, knowing others, getting in contact with them (“contact” in the
19
th-century usually meant death sentence for many non-Western
cultures) is the first step towards their destruction. In the contempo-
rary world, this destruction need not be physical or brutal – it is
enoughtoinsertdifferentculturalvalues,tomakepeopleobedient to
any authority (one of the important aspects from the colonial past
that facilitated Rwandan massacre – as noted in Zarembo, 1997), or
to institute the policies such as forced removals (which effectively
rippedapartthesocialfabricofmanySouthAfricanblackcommuni-
ties). But there are very different types of others and different strate-
gies employed to “deal” with them.
In a sense, womenare the ultimate “others.” They are an inte-
gral part ofthe worldand atthe sametimehave been throughout his-
tory excluded (partially or completely) from full participation in it
(Riley, 1988). Sometimes observed and studied in “primitive” soci-
eties, they have only recently become active participants in “main-
stream” sciences and humanities, adding a specific (or should I say:
gender specific) point of view. This opens numerous possibilities, as
summed up by Toni Flores:
What is interesting, I think, is that because male culture is of-
ficially the valued and powerful one, womencomewith some
determination to grasp what we have been denied – and from
this realization come the various women’s movements. On
the other hand, because female culture, along with the femi-
nine possibilities it carries, is both devalued and disempow-
ered, it is hard for men to recognize or accept that they lack
something, much less attempt actively to grasp what they
hardly know they want.
(Flores, 1991: 143)
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or “female culture” – they both seem to be too general and too uni-
versalizingandtotalizing, tryingtosubsumeagreatvarietyofdiffer-
ent discourses under a common denominator. However, it seems to
me that in everyday life there exists a sense of polarity and ambiva-
lencewhenitcomestotheissuesdealing withgender.Anthropology
and social sciences in general are no exception to this. The picture
has been distorted, people realize that and begin to wander what the
“real” image looks like.
The extent to which anthropology can (or even should) re-
shape this distorted picture remains unclear, but anthropology as
something standing outside the contemporary world, in the realm of
the“pure”scienceisafiction.
7Itismybeliefthatanthropologists (as
well as social scientists) have a duty and an obligation (both as hu-
manbeingsandascriticalintellectuals) toatleasttrytopresent“oth-
ers” in an acceptable way (acceptable for the others in the first
place!). Since they depend on their existence (that is to say, the very
existence of others is a prerequisite for their profession), it is in their
(existential)interesttoassurethattheothersarerepresentedinanac-
ceptable way and that the “natives” are able both to represent and to
express themselves in a ways that they find most appropriate.
8
I do not intend to fully adopt here Asad’s (1979) thesis that
what really matters in terms of social change today is the movement
of world capital and the globalization of world economic processes
(although I do believe that terms like “market economy” in contem-
porary usage are nonsense invented by the people in power in order
to retain and globalize this power
9), but this thesis reflects a part of
the problem. On another note, as I pointed out in an earlier paper on
Macedonia, economic power is quite important in gender relations:
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7 At least as much as the very concept that any science can be “pure,” “objec-
tive,” “disinterested,” or politically “neutral – cf. Feyerabend, 1987, 1993. This also
goesforthearts–asOrwellrightlynotedinhisessaypublishedin1946(2004:5).
8 Obviously, the question then arises (and I do not claim to know the answer
to it): who decides what is an adequate representation of the other in a specific con-
text, and based on what criteria?
9 To claim that any Third World country can just step into the “world econ-
omy” and there successfully compete with developed countries (much of whose de-
velopment and stability was achieved at the expense of the Third World) is simply
perverse.the more one has, the less likely that she will be marginalized
(Boškoviæ 2001). If anthropology is to incorporate such a thesis,
then anthropologists should be actively involved in the processes of
social change. The experience of the reality “lived” can be more
helpful than the experience of the reality “theorized.” However, as
academics, they usually claim (publicly, at least) no allegiance to a
particular political system or ideology. As scientists, they are sup-
posed to be “neutral.” Again, the idea that “neutrality” in a great
post-romantic sense is simply impossible in any science (including
anthropology) is nothing new or original. While most authors will
claimthattheirinterpretation ofthedata(andtheirfieldnotes,statis-
tics,etc.)arereasonably(ifnotabsolutely)“objective,” theyarewell
aware that others are not quite that “neutral” or “objective.” Anthro-
pologists need others, both in ethnography and in theory, and even
when others are actually their fellow anthropologists.
An interesting situation occurs when feminist authors (as
“others”) write on women (as “others” as well): are they “feminist”
or even radical enough? (For example, as noted by Henrietta Moore
in her book Passion for Difference.) Where does feminism end and
“pure” or “disengaged” research start? Is it possible to be a feminist
and at the same time do this kind of research on feminist discourses
orpractices? Sinceothersare“there”(andweare“here”)–andthere
is no way to find out whether they have always been, or were just
constructed by ourselves – then, the main question for me is how to
approach this fact. What to do with the others?
The answer is not as obvious as it seems.Obviously, one does
not ignore others, although it is relatively easy to pretend that they
do not exist (since this is only pretending, one is still aware of them
and just makes a conscious effort to avoid them). But this attempt at
avoiding does not deny their existence! Even if we bypass some-
thing, weimplicitly acknowledge the fact that there is something out
there (to be avoided). Others can be studied, but then the question
might arise from whose perspective and why. What gives the right
(any right) to anthropologists (or social scientists in general) to go
around and study various ethnic groups, and then subsequently pub-
lish the most intimate details of their lives? From another perspec-
tive, the dependence of anthropologists on their “informants” (the
word has a slightly Orwellian sound for me)is almost complete, and
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tainedinthefield.Veryrarelytheyassumethattheymighthavebeen
told something simply because the “natives” wanted to please them
or to avoid probing into the more intimate aspects of their lives.
Questions relating to the privacy and the actual wishes of the others
(the “observed ones”) are increasingly becoming paramount in any
serious research project. Although the situation seems to be most
tricky with regard to the fieldwork (positioning of oneself with
his/her “objects of study,” questions regarding even ethics of disclo-
sure of certain details, anthropologists’ personal life “in the field,”
etc.), it is even worse when one actually studies texts.
Therelationship between differentsocial-studies’approaches
and the study of gender is in no way simple or straightforward, as
noted by Marilyn Strathern:
[T]heconstant rediscoverythatwomenaretheOtherinmen’s
accounts reminds women that they must see men as the Other
in relation to themselves. Creating a space for women be-
comescreating a space for the self, an experience becomesan
instrument for knowing the self. Necessary to the construc-
tion of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other. The
Otherismostgenerally conceived as“patriarchy,”the institu-
tions and persons who represent male domination, often sim-
ply concretized as “men.”[cf. Toni Flores, above.] Because
the goal is to restore to subjectivity a self dominated by the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who
stand for the Other.
(Strathern, 1987: 288)
However,thequestions relating tootherness and identity lead
totheonesondifference(s).Theotherisrecognized asotherbecause
it is different. Although, as noted above, these differences are often
constructed or simply invented retroactively in order to justify
actions.
Another good example is provided by the race. Most social
scientists reject the very existence of it. Genetically, it makes no
sense.However,thefactofthematteristhatpeople dolookdifferent
to some people – and this has serious social, political, or economic
implications. I again refer to Linke (1999) on the (Western)
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ing here from South Africa (and after Brazil), is the way that South
Africans and Brazilians are burdened and frequently overwhelmed
with this concept and its implications.
While the official Brazilian discourses in the last 70 years
(following right-wing writer and intellectual Gilberto Freyre) or so
speak of the “racial democracy” (democracia racial), South Afri-
cans had their “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (TRC) to
help them deal with the horrific legacy of the apartheid regime. For
the outside world and for the politicians, the TRC has been a huge
success. For the less privileged people, however, the story is much
different, as it is perceived as the mechanism that enabled some
mass-scale murderers to get away with their crimes. (And, as Judy
Grant pointed out,
10 the women remained victimized during the pro-
ceedings as well!) There was some talk of reparations for the vic-
tims, but the reparations are not on the agenda of the current South
African government.
Race is the determining factor of South African politics –
black people (majority of the population) will always vote for the
ANC – regardless of the ANC government’s actual policies. On the
other hand, the “official opposition”, DA, seemstotally incapable of
addressing the non-white population, they appear to be permanently
locked into the South African whites’ (especially when it comes to
the English-speaking whites, who believe that they are actually in
England and, for example, usually refuse to learn any Black African
language) isolation – as they have lived for decades separate and
sheltered lives, their points of reference also tend to be in complete
isolation from the non-whites’ problems or perceptions. The prob-
lems are made worse by the perception (see for example the reports
of the International Working and Advisory Group 2000) that only
whites can be racist. This masksthe obvious racismthat exists in the
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10 At the “Hidden Genders” conference at the University of Natal, Durban, on
15,September2001.Inherstudy(basedoninterviewswithsixwomenwhogavetes-
timonies at the TRC), Grant showed how the suffering of these women (battered,
raped, abused) was simplyignored (no one even asked themabout it)in the justifica-
tion of the “struggle” of the ANC against the oppressive regime. Some influential
commentatorsinterpretedtheirapparentsilenceasthefactthattheyfound“thestrug-
gle” much more important than their own lives, but Grant showed that this was not
the case – simply, no one was interested in their suffering.majorityofthe black and coloured populations aswell–directed not
only against whites, but even more against (black poor) immigrants
fromother African countries (like Angola or Mozambique), who are
frequently attacked, abused, or even killed. However, as South Afri-
cans today officially subscribe to the policies of “non-racialism,” it
is politically incorrect to mention this, so the problems of dealing
withtheburdenofracejustgetpostponedfortheindefinitefuture.
Thesituation inBrazilisverymuchdifferentineverydaylife.
AsmostBraziliansareclearly“mixed”(thatistosay,theywouldde-
finitively not pass as looking “European” – in Istanbul or else-
where), there is no overt racismamong the ordinary people (and that
is one of the reasons why, for example, Spike Lee’s filmsalways fail
toattract big audiences inBrazil). Theproblemofidentification gets
into play here: even though in the official census Brazilians can
choose only one of the four offered categories (white, black,
“brown,” or Indian), in reality of their everyday lives they use more
than 130 categories forthe racial identification! Where one puts her-
self/himself can be quite different from the official census – so one
gets to the official percentage that Brazil has only 6 per cent blacks
(International WorkingandAdvisoryGroup2000)–ortotheunoffi-
cial that the number is around 40 per cent (cf. Boškoviæ 2005). The
Brazilian racism becomes more visible when one gets to universi-
ties,wheretherearecomparativelyfewnon-whitestudents,andboth
students and staff begin to look surprisingly “European”. Finally,
when one gets into the political arena (the Congress and the Senate),
the percentage of non-whites is so miniscule (in 2002, there were
only four blacks in the 81-seat Senate), that it becomes negligible.
When the [then] president Fernando Henrique Cardoso decreed in
2001 that universities must observe quotas (that is to say, include a
certain proportion of non-white staffand students), it created an out-
cry in the academic community that it will lead to the “lowering of
standards” of teaching and research. Very few people in the aca-
demiccommunity(almostexclusively white!) have attempted to un-
derstand why the quotas were necessary in the first place.
“It wasn’t me!” is quite a common excuse of the privileged
minorities in both countries. “It has nothing to do with me – the oth-
ers were doing it!” As one had nothing to do with the previous op-
pressive policies, the collective amnesia takes place and the world
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5begins in the year zero (a moment chosen by the privileged commu-
nity and sanctified by the mechanisms such as the TRC in South Af-
rica), without any effort to understand what has happened in the past
and what are the consequences for the future. By perpetuating a cer-
tain type of discourse (in South Africa, directed to English-speaking
whites and affluent blacks), excluding the less privileged ones, soci-
eties create boundaries of “us” and “them”, boundaries that cannot
be transgressed, as people are (in both South Africa and Brazil) sim-
ply“born into” defined racial categories. Similarlyto the Hegel’sfa-
mous analogy of the Master and Slave, the oppressed ones in South
Africa rose to power, but only to adopt the language of the former
Masters–withoutactuallyachievingeconomicorsocialfreedomfor
the majority of the population.
Concluding remarks: Deconstructing the other
We National Socialists have found a very specific definition
for the state… it has only a purpose if its final task is the pres-
ervationofthelivingfolkdom.Itmustnotonlybethelifepre-
server of a people, but thereby primarily the preserver of the
inner essence, the maintainer of a nation’s blood. Other than
this, the state has no purpose in the long run.
Adolf Hitler speaking in 1937
(quoted in Linke, 1999: 209)
Locating others inspace and timehelps create boundaries (cf.
Barth in Cohen, 2000; Balibar, 1997: 381-395) that in effect help us
establishouridentity(eitherbyconstructing it,orbychoosinganap-
propriate one for an occasion). Others are important markers of
where does the familiar end. Problems arise when people start to se-
riously believe in the unity and immutability of their ethnic group or
race (or any other similar category), when the assumption is that the
purity is almost there, just a little effort away. Of course, historically
speaking, there are no (and, as far as we can tell from the available
archaeological data, there werenever any)ethnically “pure”popula-
tions. Striving for one looks like a misplaced ideal, attempt to
achieve something that its creators know (or at least should know) is
impossible.
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thebusesadornedwithMiloševic’sportraitsinYugoslaviainthelate
1980s,tothefranticflag-wavingintheUSAtoday.Massidentity,we
are told, should take primacy over the individual one. This, of
course, stands in sharp contrast with the proclaimed (Western) lib-
eral goals of individual rights and responsibilities (cf. Billig, 1995,
Eriksen, 2002). Ideally, individuals are supposed to surrender parts
of their sovereignty to governments or other higher entities. Practi-
cally, some individuals are not too happy about this (there is a long
list of organizations who oppose censorship of the Net – too long to
be mentioned here, but shows that resistance is certainly possible).
Someofthisisseeninallthedebatesabout“multiculturalism”
– perceived as a dangerous virus threatening to dilute the perceived
heterogeneous fabric of societies (frequently identified as “blood” –
Linke,1999).Thisiswhatgivesrisetoextremeright-wingpoliticians
throughout “Europe” – and very clear example is the success of
Jean-Marie Le Pen in France.
11 What the commentators failed to see
was that Le Pen was only a symptom – not the disease. His success
only demonstrated the failure of the “new Europe” to come to terms
with ambiguity of its own discourses about others (immigrants, for-
eigners, minorities). It is not possible to adopt the neo-liberal policies
of closing off markets (and restricting the movement of individuals)
and labeling everything different as “strange” and “dangerous” with-
out the consequencesthat include re-vamping the extreme right-wing
ideologies. The fear of the other was the fuel of ideologies like Na-
zism (Linke, 1999: 198 ff), and it is unclear why some politicians
(who in 2002 seemed so horrified at the success of Le Pen, in 2001
were so surprised by Silvio Berlusconi, and a year before by Jörg
Haider – it seems to me that the only surprising thing here is the sur-
prise itself!) seem to believe that the same fear will not produce the
same effects seventy years later. The “rhetorics of exclusion”
(Stolcke, 1995), so cherished by the Western industrialized leader-
ships, is leading the way for new racist and neo-fascist ideologies.
From the standpoint of long-term policies, this might not be too bad
for the politicians in power – as more and more people get disen-
chanted and disillusioned with what is going on in their societies,
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11 Again, the phenomenon is not that new – I presented something about it as
far back as May, 1997 (Boškoviæ, 1998: 127).chancesarethatmoreandmorewillsimplystayathome,notvoteand
leave everything to tightly connected cliques and “advisory boards”
that will in effect govern societies far away from any mechanisms of
control. In the short run, however, this is going to produce a series of
clashes – and the immediate consequences are difficult to predict.
Iwish Icould end on a more positive note, but mypoint is that
being aware of certain phenomena or processes (and making them
visible in public and exposed for what they really are) could help one
determinewhethertotakecertainactionsornot.Thechoiceisimpor-
tant here – people can make a difference if they want to. (The French
voterscouldhavevotedforcandidatesotherthanLePenin2002,but
many opted to stay at home… Taking a look at French politics, can
one really blame them?) It seems quite obvious that the respect and
recognition of the other are necessary if we want to be respected and
recognized by anyone outside ourselves – for what are we all if not
others for some other observers, in other situations, under other
points of view, in other circumstances and other perspectives?
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SLIKA DRUGOG: PRIJATELJ, STRANAC, PATRIOTA?
Sa etak
Utekstuserazmatrajupredstaveikonstrukcijedrugostiusavremenomsvetu.
Slikedrugihsuuistovremeipredstavenassâmih, presvegakrozmetaforu„stranca“.
„Stranac“ovdepredstavljanepoznatoi,kaotakav,ona/onmo eizazvatistrahiodboj-
nost, makar i samo zbog toga što izgleda drugaèije od pripadnika „osnovne“ ili
„domaæe“ kulture. U tekstu se razmatra razvoj odreðenih modernistièkih ideala
(ukljuèujuæituipotrebudasepostojanjedrugogpostavikaoèudnoipotencijalnopre-
teæe). Ono što izgleda kao nedostatak razumevanja za (kulturne, etnièke, rasne) druge
samo je simptom mnogo dubljeg poremeæaja – u potrazi za racionalnošæu izgleda da
je zaboravljeno znaèenje jednostavne ljudske komunikacije. Baš kao u dvorani sa
ogledalima, predstave na koje ljudi nailaze su slike njih samih – samo što su izmenje-
ne nacionalistièkom ili rasistièkom retorikom. Koristeæi primere iz teorije (antropolo-
gija, feminizam i kulturne studije), kao i iz razlièitih kultura (Brazil, Ju na Afrika,
bivša Jugoslavija, Francuska) i pozivajuæi se na radove autora poput Kristeve, Linke i
Balibara, autor ukazuje na logiku izopštavanja drugih, kao i na èinjenicu da mnogi
ovakvipokušajiizopštavanjaprerastajuusopstvenusuprotnost.Jernemoguæejeizba-
citi druge a da u isto vreme ne izbacimo i sebe same.
Kljuène reèi: predstave drugosti, antropološki aspekti prouèavanja drugih,
antropologija i identitet, politièka antropologija.
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